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 COMPOSITIONAL IDIOMS
 DAVID PITTrr JERROLD J. KATZ
 Iowa State University CUNY Graduate Center
 In this article we argue that there is a large class of expressions, typified by plastic flower,
 stuffed animal and kosher bacon, that have a unique semantics combining compositional, idiomatic
 and decompositional interpretation. These expressions are compositional because their constituents
 contribute their meanings to the meanings of the wholes; they are idiomatic because their interpre-
 tation involves assigning dictionary entries to nonterminal elements in their syntactic structure;
 and they are decompositional because their meanings have proper parts that are not the meanings
 of any of their syntactic constituents. We argue that extensionalist semantics, on which the meaning
 of an expression is a function from domains to extensions in those domains, cannot provide an
 adequate account of the semantics of these expressions, and that supplementation with a theory
 of pragmatic interpretation does not improve the situation. We show how our account explains
 the intensionality and the productivity of these expressions.*
 1. INTRODUCTION. The title of this article seems to be an oxymoron. Compositional
 expressions are ones whose meaning is a function of the meanings of their subconsti-
 tuents and their syntactic relations. Idioms, in contrast, are expressions whose meaning
 does not depend on the meanings of their subconstituents. Although it appears at first
 that the present article could no more have a subject than one bearing the title Round
 Squares, appearances are deceiving. The expressions in 1 have a meaning that is both
 compositional and idiomatic.
 (1) a. plastic flower
 b. stuffed animal
 c. kosher bacon
 d. rubber chicken
 More specifically, these expressions all have readings involving the concept of an
 IMITATION, which is not derivable from either the head noun or the modifier directly.
 Plastic flower means (on one sense) something like 'imitation flower made of plastic',
 stuffed animal something like 'imitation animal made with (or by) stuffing', kosher
 bacon something like 'imitation bacon made in accordance with kosher dietary restric-
 tions', and so on. As in the case of standard idioms (kick the bucket, spill the beans),
 this underived interpretation is directly assigned to the expression as a whole. Yet,
 unlike idioms, the expressions in 1 have meanings partly determined by the meanings
 of their constituents: plasticflower means 'imitation flower made of plastic', rubber
 chicken means 'imitation chicken made of rubber', and so forth. Moreover, also unlike
 idioms, but like compositional expressions, these expressions are PRODUCTIVE. Thus,
 we have plastic tulip, silkflower, stuffed elephant, kosher Canadian bacon-all with
 related and predictable meanings.1
 The discovery of a phenomenon combining compositionality and idiomaticity neces-
 * We are indebted to Robert Fiengo, Mark Aronoff, Steven Cushing, and two anonymous referees for
 helpful criticism of previous drafts.
 1 An additional interesting feature of these expressions, to be discussed below, is that on their imitation
 readings they are semantically NONCONJUNCTIVE: plastic flowers are not things that are plastic and flowers,
 stuffed animals are not things that are stuffed and animals, and so on.
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 sitates a revision in the way we understand those concepts in descriptive semantics.2
 In this article we describe the implications of the phenomenon for the nature of composi-
 tionality and idiomaticity and for our understanding of the mechanisms of compositional
 combination and idiom interpretation.
 Our study of compositional idioms has implications for both descriptive and theoreti-
 cal semantics. The principal implication for theoretical semantics is to strengthen the
 case for an intensional theory of meaning in linguistic semantics. In the seventies,
 extensional theories of linguistic meaning gained ascendency over intensional theories.
 This, as we see it, resulted from two factors. One was the growing influence in linguistics
 of Quine's skepticism about theories of meaning (1960, ch. 2, 1953, 20-64). The other
 was the increasingly broad application of model-theoretic logic in linguistic semantics,
 as an attempt to solve all the problems of a troubled area in one field by importing a
 newly developed apparatus from another field. Given the collapse of Quine's skeptical
 arguments against intensional theories of meaning, something which he himself (Quine
 1990; also Clark 1993) now seems to acknowledge, and the fact that it is becoming
 increasingly clear that fundamental problems of linguistic semantics have not yielded
 to the application of model-theoretic apparatus, it is time to reexamine the wisdom of
 continuing to rely exclusively upon purely extensional approaches to meaning.
 Today, the Davidsonian and Carnapian theories of meaning are the two most popular
 extensional approaches. Both conceive of linguistic meaning as functions from a domain
 to a set of objects belonging to the domain. Davidsonian and Camapian theories differ
 in whether the domain for the interpretation of a language is restricted to the actual
 world or includes other possible worlds as well. Philosophers and linguists working
 within these approaches are confident that the apparatus of extensional functions can
 be extended to cover any semantic phenomena in natural language, and, hence, they
 think that a purely referential semantics is all that is needed for natural language. They
 thus think that theories that postulate senses-nonextensionally individuated inten-
 sions-are unmotivated, and, hence, eliminable on grounds of simplicity.
 We will argue that the semantics of compositional idioms shows that extensional
 functions are inappropriate for the description of sentence meaning within grammar,
 and, further, that the proper form for such description is representations of senses. This
 is not to claim that extensional functions have no significant role in linguistic semantics,
 but to claim that their role is confined to relating the expressions whose senses are
 represented in the grammar to their referents in the domain of the language. The two
 meanings of the term SEMANTICS- 'theory of sense' and 'theory of reference' -must
 be kept separate.
 To be sure, this line of criticism is not new. Previous studies have criticized exten-
 sional approaches on the basis of other semantic phenomena, such as the selective way
 in which an evaluative adjective like good operates compositionally (a point to which
 we will return), the fine-grainedness of the synonymy relation, opacity, and the composi-
 tional meaning of certain types of action sentences (see Katz 1986, Katz et al. 1985
 and Ravin 1990). But a new phenomenon can often make old points more forcefully,
 2 Some recent work on idioms (e.g. Nunberg et al. 1994, Jackendoff 1995) has challenged the orthodox
 construal of idioms as semantically noncompositional, claiming that the combination of compositionality
 and idiomaticity is in fact quite common. The expressions we study here are quite different from those
 studied by Nunberg et al.: they are NOT idioms, but, as suggested in the text, a distinct kind of expression
 with a unique semantics (which is in certain respects LIKE the semantics of idioms as classically construed).
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 both because the freshness of the phenomenon can provide a clearer view of the issues
 and because the new phenomenon extends a pattern encountered elsewhere.
 The family of expressions typified by the compositional idioms in 1 has a unique
 semantics combining elements of compositional and idiomatic interpretation that resists
 a fully adequate analysis in purely referential terms-including those of such sophisti-
 cated extensionalist theories as Montague semantics and the thematic role theories of
 generative grammarians. We will also argue that Gricean and more recent pragmatic
 theories, which are often invoked to take up interpretive slack left by an extensionalist
 semantics, do not apply in cases like 1.
 2. EXTENSIONALIST EXPLANATION. The theory of a language must explicate the ways
 in which the meaning of a syntactically complex expression of the language depends
 upon the meanings of its constituents and their syntactic relations. The construction of
 a compositional semantics for a natural language involves the identification of semanti-
 cally relevant syntactic operations and the provision of semantic operations correspond-
 ing to them. One prominent example of such a syntactic operation is modification. In
 modification, a noun, adjective, adverb or preposition (or phrase headed by such item)
 is attached to another noun, adjective, adverb or preposition (or phrase headed by such
 item) to yield a complex expression of the same syntactic category as the head.
 On the Davidsonian and Carnapian approaches, the semantic operation corresponding
 to modification is an extensional function. We will consider such functions in the
 Carnapian approach because it is the more general form of the two in making use of the
 apparatus of possible worlds. INTENSIONS in the Carnapian approach are not intensions in
 the sense of traditional intensionalism, but functions from indices (ordered n-tuples
 consisting of a possible world plus further entities such as a time or context), to exten-
 sions (sets, sets of sets, ordered n-tuples, truth values, etc.). We shall refer to them as
 CARNAPIAN INTENSIONS or more simply EXTENSIONAL FUNCTIONS to avoid confusion.
 In the most basic cases, the compositional meaning of a modifier-head construction
 is a simple set-theoretic function of the extension of the modifier and the extension of
 the head. In such a semantics, the function is conjunctive: the extensions of the head
 and the modifier are the sets of objects to which they apply, and the extension of the
 phrase is the intersection of those sets. Thus, for example, the extension of the phrase
 female senator is the set of objects that are both female and senators. Cases involving
 intensional modifiers, such as former senator (whose extension is not a function of the
 extensions of its parts),3 can be accommodated in a referential semantics by treating
 the Carnapian intension of the modifier as a higher-order function that operates on the
 Carnapian intension of the noun it modifies.
 The extension of former senator in a world w at a time t is the intersection of the
 3 Substitutivity and existential generalization fail within the scope of former, as the following examples
 show.
 (i) Brown was the first mayor of Normaltown, and Smith was its first chief of police. Now, however,
 Jones holds both offices.
 The extensions of mayor of Normaltown and police chief of Normaltown are the same (viz., Jones), while
 the extensions of former mayor of Normaltown (viz., Brown) and former police chief of Normaltown (viz.,
 Smith) are different.
 (ii) a. Ringo Starr is the former drummer of the Beatles.
 b. (3x)(Ringo Starr is the former drummer of x).
 The inference (iia-b) is invalid. There needn't be, at time t, a thing x such that Ringo Starr is the former
 drummer of x at t in order for Ringo Starr to be the former drummer of x at t.
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 complement of the set of senators in w at t with the union of all sets of senators in w
 at times earlier than t.4 The Carnapian intension of senator picks out sets of senators
 across all worlds and times, and the Carnapian intension offormer selects from among
 them and effects set-theoretic operations appropriate to yield the desired extension for
 the phrase. Thus, though the semantics of such expressions is not conjunctive (the
 extension of former senator is not the set of objects that are former and senators), it
 is compositional: the Carnapian intension of former senator is determined on the basis
 of the Carnapian intensions of former and senator and their syntactic combination.
 Moreover, given that Camrnapian intensions are individuated extensionally, that is, two
 intensions are identical if and only if they determine the same extensions in all possible
 worlds, the semantics offormer phrases is also extensional. The core idea of extension-
 alist semantics-that interpretation is a matter of directly relating expressions to the
 world-is thus preserved, in spite of what at first looked like a counterexample.
 Examples like those in 1 also present a challenge to the core idea of extensionalist
 semantics. It is intuitively clear that their meanings are not conjunctive in the manner
 of female senator: female senators are senators, but plastic flowers are not flowers,
 stuffed animals are not animals, kosher bacon is not bacon, and vegetarian chicken is
 not chicken. Contrast the expressions in 1 with other expressions containing the same
 modifiers, such as plastic bag, stuffed mushroom, kosher chicken, and vegetarian pizza,
 or the same head nouns, such as edible flower, feline animal, Canadian bacon and
 free-range chicken, all of which have straightforwardly conjunctive senses. Moreover,
 the expressions in 1 appear to be intensional as well, exhibiting failure of both substitu-
 tivity and existential generalization at the head-noun position (for example, unicorn
 and minotaur are coextensive at the actual world, but plastic unicorn and plastic mino-
 taur are not, likewise stuffed unicorn and stuffed minotaur; the inference from Elvis
 has a plastic son of God on his dashboard to (3x)(Elvis has a plastic son of x on his
 dashboard) is invalid). (We shall return to this point below.)
 These facts suggest that the core idea of extensionalist semantics might be preserved
 by an application of the apparatus of higher-order extensional functions, as in the case
 of former compounds. There is an initial doubt that such a move will work for all of
 our cases, since the modifier in the case of former senator is syncategorematic, while
 the modifiers of compositional idioms refer (plastic flowers are plastic, stuffed animals
 are stuffed, kosher bacon is kosher, etc.). Moreover, if the Carnapian intension of
 modifier M in a compositional idiom is a function picking out sets of things that are
 M at all indices, and the intension of a head H is a function picking out sets of Hs at
 all indices, then the values of these functions will always be, respectively, sets of Ms
 and sets of Hs (e.g. sets of plastic things and sets of flowers). We will argue, however,
 that there are no distinctions among the extensions of either the modifiers or the heads
 of compositional idioms across different indices that could be exploited to construct
 for them correct extension-determining intensions as a function of the intensions of
 their parts.
 The analysis of former succeeds because the property of being a former F involves
 the property of being an F in an extensional way: an object can only be in the extension
 4 Generally:
 [former FMwn tm = [FlM wn tm n U [[[F tm for all m < n]
 (This analysis corrects an error in the example used to introduce Carnapian intensions in Dowty et al. 1981
 and Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990. On the analysis found in these texts (and others that follow them),
 the extension of former F includes present Fs.)
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 of former F if it at one time was in the extension of F.5 The extension of former F
 may thus be constructed out of the complement of the present set of Fs and sets of
 past Fs using the intensions of former and rF in the way shown above. The past-
 F/present-F/future-F distinction yielded by including temporal coordinates in indices
 can be exploited to construct a function that gets the extension of former F right. But
 plastic flowers never were or will be flowers. Indeed, on the reading concerned here,
 plastic flowers COULDN'T BE flowers; mutatis mutandis for the other expressions in 1 .6
 How should these intuitive facts be explained? Note, to focus on our representative
 case, that the necessary incompatibility of being a plastic flower and being a flower
 can't be either logical or semantic. Though such incompatibility might explain why
 plastic flowers are not flowers, if it were due to the meanings of plastic and flower,
 plastic flower would have to be either contradictory or semantically anomalous. But
 plasticflower is neither; indeed, if it were, it would necessarily be referentially vacuous.
 But if it is logically and semantically (though perhaps not biologically) possible for
 flowers to be made of plastic, what of the intuition that the referents of plastic flower,
 wooden Indian, and rubber chicken are necessarily not flowers, Indians, and chickens?
 The answer we propose is that plastic flower and the other expressions in 1 are
 AMBIGUOUS between a conjunctive sense, on which, for example, a plastic F is both
 plastic and an F, and a nonconjunctive sense, on which a plastic F is plastic and an
 imitation F. The senses of plastic flower et al. on their nonconjunctive readings include
 a component that is not derived from either of their syntactic constituents. Though this
 ambiguity is not obvious in the case of plastic flower, notice that it is for other expres-
 sions of the kind illustrated in 1. A plastic heart, for example, can be either a heart in
 someone's chest pumping blood through her body or a biology class model of a heart
 that is incapable of functioning as a pump. We live in a world in which plastic heart
 has a nonempty extension on both senses of the ambiguity. Even clearer is the case of
 stuffed animal. A stuffed animal can be a toy (made by some process involving stuffing),
 and, hence, not an animal, or a taxidermied animal-an animal that is stuffed. Here
 again we have nonempty actual-world extensions on both readings.
 Plastic flower is only contingently different. In the actual world there are no real
 flowers made of plastic, only fake ones. But there are possible worlds in which there
 are real flowers made of plastic. The biological, chemical or physical laws in those
 worlds may or may not be substantially different from those of the actual world. For
 all we know now, science may one day revolutionize the artificial flower industry by
 discovering how to grow such botanoids. In any case, the worlds in which real flowers
 made of plastic grow naturally are to some degree remote from ours. The nonobvious-
 ness of the ambiguity in the case of plastic flower is due to the relative remoteness of
 the possible worlds in which its conjunctive reading has a nonempty extension. Kosher
 bacon is a complimentary case, since we have to travel to other possible worlds (in
 which kosher laws are different) for kosher bacon in the conjunctive sense.
 Now, the property of being a plastic flower does not involve the property of being
 5 We assume here an identification of the senses of predicates and properties. This is a fairly common
 assumption in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. (Montague, for example, thought of his
 notion of an intension as a reconstruction of the notion of a property (see Montague 1974).)
 6 We will take cases like plastic flower, rubber chicken, glass eye, etc., to be representative of the class
 of compositional idioms (and plastic flower to be representative of this subclass). The differences of detail
 among the examples in 1 will not affect the applicability of the points we make with respect to plasticflower
 et al. Where appropriate, we note what some of the differences are, and how they might be accommodated.
 (See for example ?5.)
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 a flower in the way that being a former senator involves the property of being a senator.
 Thus, the Carnapian intension of plastic cannot be construed as an operator on the
 Camrnapian intension of flower; and the same is true for all of the other modifiers in
 this class. Nor is it feasible to treat the Carnapian intensions of the heads as operators
 on the Carnapian intensions of the modifiers. Note that a Montague grammar will
 already assign to the heads as their Carnapian intensions functions on indices, not other
 intensions. Moreover, even if the heads were reassigned a higher-order function, it is
 difficult to see how the assignment could be exploited to yield the correct extension.
 The intension of plastic, for example, is a function picking out sets of plastic things,
 at all indices. Which among these sets, or the sets constructible from them, is the correct
 extension of plastic flower? And how is it determined by the Camrnapian intension of
 flower?
 If, as just suggested, the correct extension for plastic flower in a domain is a set of
 imitation flowers made of plastic, then the Carnapian intension of flower would have
 to be an extensional function that picks out the subset of things in the extension of
 plastic that are imitation flowers. But how plausible is this as a gloss on the meaning
 of flower? The Carnapian intension assigned to former is a principled reconstruction
 of the intuitive sense of that word within an extensionalist approach. But the present
 proposal is entirely ad hoc. It amounts to glossing the sense of flower as imitation
 flower. What' s more, it assigns implausible interpretations to expressions like
 real flower (?'real imitation flower'), fake flower (?'fake imitation flower'), and edible
 flower (?'edible imitation flower').
 If neither the extensions nor the Carnapian intensions of the expressions in 1 are
 functions of the extensions/Carnapian intensions of their parts, then, an extensionalist
 semantics (e.g. Montague-style semantics) will have to treat them as semantically primi-
 tive. Carnapian intensions of primitive expressions are simple extension-determining
 functions with no internal structure; they are simply correlations of expressions with
 extensions at all indices. The loss of generality in taking such expressions to be primitive
 is excessive: each expression in 1 would have to be treated as a separate case. Intuitively,
 however, these expressions are PRODUCTIVE. Treating them as primitive would sacrifice
 productivity to ideology.
 We conclude that an extensional semantics cannot do justice to the intuitive meanings
 of modifier-head compounds like those in 1. We further claim that this failure is due
 to the fact that extensional functions are individuated only by aspects of the syntactic
 structure to which they apply, and by aspects of the domain. In the final section of this
 article, we will explain why this restriction prevents us from capturing the nonexten-
 sional contributions of the meanings of the modifier and head in the expressions in 1
 to the meaning of the whole construction.
 3. THEMATIC EXPLANATION. We claim that plastic flower is semantically ambiguous,
 meaning either 'flower made of plastic' or 'imitation flower made of plastic'.7 We note
 the existence of a certain parallel with the ambiguous expressions 2 and 4.
 (2) old friend
 (3) friend who is old
 (4) poor man
 (5) man who is poor
 Old friend has the sense 'aged friend' and the sense 'friend of long standing'. The fact
 7 We will have more to say by way of defending this claim in subsequent sections.
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 that 3 has only the sense 'aged friend' suggests that the ambiguity of 2 is not due to
 the ambiguity of old. Likewise, 4 may mean either 'impoverished man' or 'pitiable
 man'. Similarly, the fact that 5 can mean only 'impoverished man' suggests that poor
 is not itself ambiguous. The same facts obtain for plastic flower and the other expres-
 sions in 1. Plastic flower may mean either 'flower made of plastic' or 'imitation flower
 made of plastic', while 6
 (6) flower that is plastic
 can mean only 'flower made of plastic', suggesting that plastic is not ambiguous be-
 tween 'made of plastic' and 'plastic-imitation'.
 These parallels suggest both that the sort of extensional semantics considered above
 will not adequately account for the ambiguity of 2 and 4, and that an explanation in
 one case will work in the other.
 Some linguists have attempted to explain the facts about 2 and 4 in terms of thematic
 roles. Given the similarities between these facts and the facts about the expressions in
 1 on their nonconjunctive senses, it would be natural to try to apply the thematic-role
 apparatus to explain the nonconjunctive senses of the expressions in 1.
 Thematic roles enter the linguistic literature with Fillmore 1968 and Gruber 1965.
 Fillmore introduced his conception of CASE, and Gruber his conception of THEMATIC
 RELATION, to explain certain conceptual relations that they claimed hold between a verb
 and its arguments, and that they felt were not captured by the traditional grammatical
 relations and cases. Cases and thematic relations are meant to characterize the arguments
 of a verb in terms of the roles their referents play in the state of affairs or event denoted
 by the sentence-such roles as agent, source, goal, and instrument.
 For our purposes, the important difference between these two theories is that Fillmore
 stipulates a one-one correspondence between Cases and syntactic arguments, while for
 Gruber the correspondence between thematic relations and arguments is, typically,
 many-one. Thus, the Case structure of a predicate is isomorphic to its first-order logical
 form, whereas thematic relations may introduce additional CONCEPTUAL argument struc-
 ture, either overlaid on or in addition to syntactic argument structure.
 This contrast is preserved among contemporary semantic theories that employ the
 construct of a thematic role. The biuniqueness of syntactic argument and Case in Fill-
 more's theory is reduplicated in the THETA-CRITERION of Chomsky's government and
 binding (GB) syntax (see Chomsky 1981:36). Chomsky, however, does not make use
 of the content of theta-roles (the relevant principles distinguish only between having
 and not having one): the theta-criterion is a condition on syntactic well-formedness.
 Thus, since the difference between the assignment of, say, AGENT, as opposed to THEME,
 does not register in the syntactic structure of a sentence, it is ignored by the theory.
 Some theorists have even gone as far as to IDENTIFY theta-roles and argument places.8
 Jackendoff's semantics reflects the basic approach of Gruber. In Jackendoff's work,
 thematic roles are identified with relational notions defined structurally over conceptual
 structure (1990:47), where the conceptual structure of a predicate is not constrained to
 match its syntactic argument structure. The need for such freedom at the semantic
 level is shown by the existence of syntactically unrealized argument places in the
 decompositional sense structure of verbs. As Katz argued (1972:332-46), buy and sell
 have senses with a syntactically unrealized argument place for terms expressing the
 8 See Van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986:241: 'the terms theta-role and thematic relation are synonyms for
 argument'.
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 concept of a sum of money (cf. the redundancy of Jack bought the magic beans for a
 sum of money).
 Higginbotham's (1985, 1987, 1989) thematic theory, which will be the focus of our
 discussion, is closely related to Chomsky's theta-theory, and thus has its roots in Fill-
 more' s work. An element of Gruber' s approach enters Higginbotham' s theory, however,
 in the latter's recognition of the possibility of syntactically unrealized, or so-called
 conceptual, argument structure-though, like Chomsky (and unlike Jackendoff), Hig-
 ginbotham makes no use whatever of thematic content. Big and toy, for example, though
 syntactically monadic, are analyzed by Higginbotham as conceptually dyadic. He
 glosses big butterfly as big-for-a-butterfly (generally, big(x) [big-for-a-(y)](x)); and
 toy gun as toy-for-a-gun (i.e. as it were, toy-in-a-gunnish-way; generally, toy(x) =
 [toy-for-a-(y)](x)) (cf. Higginbotham 1985:563). Generally, assignment, or DISCHARGE
 of theta-roles is
 understood as the filling of places in [a] predicate[], so that the notion of a role's being associated with
 a place comes on top of the more familiar idea of the sheer number of places, or adicity, of a predicate.
 (Higginbotham 1985:559)
 Higginbotham identifies four modes of thematic discharge, two of which, theta-identifi-
 cation and autonomous theta-marking, are relevant to the semantics of modification.
 In theta-identification, the mode of modification of conjunctive compounds such as
 female senator, the theta roles of head and modifier are identified, and PROJECTED to
 their dominating node.9
 (N',<1>)
 (A,<1>) (<1>,N)
 female senator
 FIGURE 1. Theta-identification.
 Theta-identification, Higginbotham notes, is analogous to the identification of variables
 in a first-order representation of a conjunctive predicate.
 For nonconjunctive compounds such as big butterfly and toy gun, Higginbotham
 postulates two theta roles for the modifier, one identified with the open position of
 heads it modifies, and the other taking the attribute expressed by the head it modifies
 as its argument, autonymously theta-marking the phrase-marker of the head. This is
 represented in Figure 2. The arrow represents the autonymous theta-marking. As before,
 the line connecting the thematic grids represents theta-identification. Finally, the the-
 matic grid of butterfly is projected to N', representing the fact that a big butterfly,
 though not big and a butterfly, is nonetheless a butterfly.
 On Higginbotham's theory, expressions like toy gun and imitation butter differ from
 big butterfly in that the theta-grids for their heads and modifiers are not identified, and
 9 This and the following diagram are adapted from Higginbotham 1985:559-68. The numbers enclosed
 in angle brackets (THEMATIC GRIDS) indicate how many theta-roles the predicate has to discharge; the line
 connecting them represents their identification. The (1) next to N' indicates that the identified theta-roles of
 the modifier and head are projected to the dominating node, resulting in a single theta-role for the compound.
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 (N',<1>)
 (A,<1,2>) (<1>,N)
 big butterfly
 FIGURE 2. Autonymous theta-marking.
 the theta-grid for the modifier is projected to the dominating node. Toy guns and
 imitation butter are thus represented as being, respectively, toys and imitations, but not
 guns or butter. Recall that plastic flowers-in the nonconjunctive sense-are plastic,
 but not flowers. These parallels suggest that our class of expressions might yield to
 this sort of account.
 Even more suggestive is Degraff and Mandelbaum's (1993) application of Higginbo-
 tham's apparatus to 2 and 4. Following Higginbotham's assumption that autonymous
 theta-marking can take place only under government (see Higginbotham 1985:566),
 Degraff and Mandelbaum (DM) postulate a syntactic ambiguity for oldfriend and poor
 man. Treating these expressions as noun phrases, they claim that autonymous theta-
 marking is blocked, and the expressions have their conjunctive readings; treating them
 as adjective phrases, DM claim that autonymous theta-marking is permitted, and the
 expressions have their nonconjunctive readings. Autonymous theta-marking is also
 blocked in 3 and 5, where postposing of the adjectives destroys government. Thus,
 DM conclude, the interpretive facts of 2-5 are accounted for. Since the facts about la
 and 6 are exactly analogous, it is natural in this context to think that their explanation
 might be the same.
 We propose to grant DM their syntactic assumptions in order to focus on the effective-
 ness of their strategy in explaining the semantic facts in 1 and 2, and its application
 to 3. According to DM, old means 'long-known' if it is taken as grading with respect
 to friendship (i.e. when 'old' autonymously theta-marks friend) and 'aged' if it is not.
 That is, following Higginbotham's treatment of big butterfly, an old (long-known)
 friend is something that is a friend and old for such, while an old (aged) friend is
 something that is a friend and is old.
 Notice, however, that an old (aged) friend is something that is a friend and, not old
 simpliciter, but old for a human. That is, in the terminology of Katz 1972 (254-61)
 old is a relative adjective like tall and big rather than an absolute adjective like carnivo-
 rous. The age qualification is relative to a reference class, as is clear in the contrast
 old American city and old European city. Old men are men and old for such; old
 mayflies are mayflies and old for such.10 Old is a covertly relational predicate, but,
 since autonymous theta-marking is blocked by the syntactic configuration assigned to
 the 'aged-friend' reading, old cannot be functioning as a relational predicate in noun
 phrases: it cannot discharge its attribute position.
 Further, the attribute with respect to which old grades on the 'long-known' reading
 of old friend, viz., humanity, is expressed by friend only on the assumption that friend
 10 Note, moreover, old man and old mayfly are not ambiguous between long-known man/mayfly and manl
 mayfly that is old.
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 is decompositionally complex. But this kind of lexical semantic structure is not available
 in Higginbotham's thematic semantics, and, hence, not available to DM either."
 The situation is slightly different, and slightly worse, in the case of poor man. Not
 only is poor relational on its conjunctive reading-poor (impoverished) kings and
 Rockefellers for example are kings and Rockefellers and poor for such-for which
 there can be no explanation given that autonymous theta-marking is blocked, but the
 theory predicts that this is what poor man means on its nonconjunctive reading-which
 is plainly false.'2 What is supposed to happen is that, in virtue of grading with respect
 to the attribute expressed by man, poor will mean 'pitiable', just as old is supposed to
 mean 'long-known' when it grades with respect to friendship. But poor in poor man
 grades with respect to manhood and it means 'poor for a man'. So the ambiguity of
 the expressions poor man and old friend is not explained. The relational readings of
 these predicates are independent of whatever thematic structure they may have.
 Also unexplained is the lack of ambiguity-the unavailability of the long-known
 and pitiable readings-infriend who is old and man who is poor. Higginbotham claims
 that when an adjective with an attribute position does not govern the noun it qualifies,
 as in Fig. 1, the choice of attribute with respect to which it grades is FREE (Higginbotham
 1985). But if the choice of attribute is free, why can't 7
 (7) That butterfly is big.
 mean, not that the butterfly in question is big for butterfly, but that it is big for a toaster,
 or a microbe, or a planet?
 Likewise, if old and poor are taken as grading with respect to an attribute whose
 choice is free in friend who is old and man who is poor, or, for that matter, when old
 friend and poor man are read as noun phrases (in both cases, no government; no
 autonymous theta-marking), then not only may old and poor receive false interpretations
 such as 'old for a mayfly' and 'poor for a king', and absurd interpretations such as
 'old for a train wreck' and 'poor for a peacock feather', but they may also receive just the
 interpretations that are supposed to be blocked.13 Finally, Degraff and Mandelbaum's
 account predicts that the conjunctive readings themselves ought to be ruled out in these
 cases, since, as we have seen, these also require the sort of relativization to an attribute
 that is reconstructed here as autonymous theta-marking.'4
 Introducing a third thematic role, whose discharge would not be blocked by the
 phrase structures that prevent autonymous theta-marking (to be identified with the
 second role in configurations of government?), would not help much, since it would
 not rule out the absurd cases. Moreover, since on Higginbotham's account thematic
 structure adds nothing to argument structure, the theory's resources seem to have been
 " It is explicitly rejected by Higginbotham, quoting Davidson 1984:
 '... it is hard to exaggerate the advantages to philosophy of language of bearing in mind this distinction
 between questions of logical form or grammar, and the analysis of individual concepts'.
 The semantic structure of a belief sentence, according to [Camap] .. . is given by a three-place predicate
 with places reserved for expressions referring to a person, a sentence, and a language. It is a different
 sort of problem entirely to attempt an analysis of this predicate. (Higginbotham 1985)
 12 This problem does not crop up in the case of old friend because old grades with respect to friendship
 on its nonconjunctive reading and humanity on its conjunctive reading-different attributes.
 13 It is also worth noting that there are indefinitely many old phrases for which a 'long-known' reading
 is simply not available: e.g. old soldier, old shoe, old house, and so on. How is this to be explained?
 14 It also does not seem to have the resources to cover a third sense of some old compounds, viz., the
 'former' sense (old car, old boyfriend, etc.).
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 exhausted. Indeed, even if theta-roles were restored their content, it is hard to see what
 that content, i.e. the notions of agent, patient, theme, and so on, would have to do with
 the meanings of these compounds.
 In any case, application of this apparatus to the expressions in 1 results in interpretive
 disaster. Assigning plastic two theta-positions, one to be identified with the open posi-
 tion of nouns it modifies, and one to mark their phrase markers, we assign two different
 syntactic structures (NP and AP) to plastic flower, one permitting and one blocking
 autonymous theta-marking. But then, in strict analogy to Higginbotham's examples,
 plastic flower would be ambiguous between 'plastic and a flower' and 'plastic for a
 flower', that is, 'plastic relative to the attribute flower'. Moreover, that flower is plastic
 could mean that the flower in question is plastic for a flower, or for a plant, or for any
 other attribute. None of which makes any sense at all.
 We conclude that thematic role theories in the style of Higginbotham also cannot
 do justice to the intuitive meanings of the expressions in 1.
 4. PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION. We have claimed that the expressions in 1 are semanti-
 cally ambiguous between a conjunctive and a nonconjunctive sense. In this section we
 will consider the objection that what we have taken to be a grammatical fact about
 expression types is in reality a pragmatic fact about their tokens. The competing prag-
 matic construal is that expressions such as plastic flower and stuffed animal have only
 ONE sense in the language and that what we take to be another sense is an utterance
 meaning, obtained on a token-by-token basis as a function of grammatical sense together
 with features of context in accordance with general principles of pragmatic interpreta-
 tion. We will argue that no pragmatic approach can be implemented in a noncircular
 or non-ad hoc way, and, hence, that the pragmatic objection has no force.
 For guidance in the formulation of pragmatic principles, it is natural to start with
 the work of H. P. Grice. Grice 1989 proposed a number of principles by which utterances
 in context may be assigned meanings that diverge from the linguistic meaning of the
 expression types uttered. His philosophical purpose was to argue against Strawson's
 1952 view that some of the logical particles of natural language are ambiguous (and
 hence not captured by the univocal operators of standard first-order logic). In light of
 these origins, Grice's approach seems a natural alternative to the account we have
 proposed.
 On Grice's account, under certain circumstances, utterances that conflict with conver-
 sational imperatives assumed to govern verbal exchanges generally are reinterpreted
 in such a way as to render them consistent with those imperatives.15 Thus, for example,
 if S utters a sentence p in conversation with H that both S and H know, and know each
 other to know, to be false (and hence in conflict with a maxim of Quality) and H has
 reason to think that S is adhering to the conversational imperatives, then S's utterance
 should be interpreted as having the linguistic meaning of another unuttered but true
 (and relevant) sentence, q. In such circumstances, S is understood to have said that p,
 but conversationally implicated that q.
 Conversational implicatures may be particularized or generalized. A particularized
 conversational implicature holds in virtue of particular features of the context of utter-
 ance. A generalized conversational implicature is due to some stable grammatical fea-
 15 These imperatives fall under the general Cooperative Principle (make only appropriate contributions to
 the exchange in which you are engaged), in the categories of Quantity (don't be over- or underinformative),
 Quality (don't say what you know to be false or unsupported by evidence), Relation (be relevant) and Manner
 (be clear and concise).
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 ture of the expression in question, and holds across a variety of contexts, in the absence
 of special considerations (NORMALLY, as Grice says). S's utterance of 8 for example,
 would normally not be interpreted to mean that the car Paul drove was his own, though
 such an interpretation is not grammatically or logically precluded (if Paul drove his
 own car, it certainly follows that he drove a car).
 (8) Paul drove a car today.
 It is a generalized implicature of this form of words (due, no doubt, at least in part, to
 the occurrence of the indefinite article) that the car in question is not owned by its
 driver (cf. Grice 1989:37-38).
 If utterances of the expressions in 1 are regularly to be interpreted as having noncon-
 junctive readings, as it seems they must, then it would seem that it is the notion of a
 generalized implicature that the pragmatic account requires. We must ask, then, what
 feature of the expressions in 1 could underwrite a generalized conversational implica-
 ture, and how it is that their nonconjunctive interpretations are implicated.
 We have already pointed out that the expressions in 1 are neither semantically contra-
 dictory nor anomalous. But, since they are certainly syntactically well-formed, and,
 furthermore, they aren't spelled or pronounced in any distinctive way, there is no
 GRAMMATICAL feature of these expressions that could distinguish them from other
 expressions such as plastic bag, stuffed artichoke, and kosher chicken that do not nor-
 mally receive nonconjunctive interpretations. Hence, Grice's notion of generalized im-
 plicature does not seem adequate to our cases. If there is an implicature, it would have
 to be particularized.
 One might say that it is a special feature of all contexts of utterance of these expres-
 sions-at least those of the type of la-that the referents of the head nouns (flowers,
 chickens, Indians, and so on) cannot (for, the hearer assumes, reasons having to do
 with general but contingent facts about biology) be made of the materials denoted by
 the modifiers (plastic, rubber, wood, etc). Utterances of these expressions would be
 marked as odd since they are generally known to be, one might say, BIOLOGICALLY
 INCONSISTENT. It would be this oddness, presumably, that would alert hearers to the
 presence of an implicature, and prompt them to search for a nonconjunctive interpreta-
 tion. Utterances of plastic flower would be interpreted by hearers who presume that
 botanical facts preclude flowers being made of plastic as meaning 'imitation flower
 made of plastic'.
 This proposal faces several serious problems, however. For one, it is hard to see
 how natural (or any other sort of) inconsistency would induce hearers to infer just the
 interpretations required. Particularized implicatures are not constant across contexts;
 they must be inferred from contextual information and the conversational maxims.
 Grice says
 the assumptions required in order to maintain the supposition that [the conversational maxims] are being
 observed ... are in systematic correspondence with non-conventional implicata of the conversational
 type. (Grice 1989:41)
 What maxim is violated by the utterance of an expression with an extension empty by
 natural necessity? It can't be that referentially empty phrases generally are so inter-
 preted, for then the word unicorn would always mean 'imitation unicorn' -which it
 obviously doesn't.16 But even were we to assume some dubious maxim such as Try
 16 The sentence There are no unicorns is true, while the sentence There are no imitation (or representations
 of) unicorns is false.
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 not to talk about or refer to things that don't (or couldn't) exist, it is not at all clear
 how the violation of such a maxim in utterances of plastic flower would ensure that
 anyone would work out the implicature 'imitation flower made of plastic', as opposed
 to simply assuming the speaker had made a mistake or that some other concept had
 been implicated, such as 'flower that looks like it is made of plastic', or 'bit of plastic
 shaped like a flower'.7
 Grice himself acknowledges this sort of problem. He had claimed that S's utterance
 to H of He's a fine friend, referring to someone S and H both know (and know each
 other to know) to have betrayed S, would naturally be interpreted by H to mean the
 'most obviously related proposition: He's not a fine friend' (see Grice 1989:34). But
 there does not seem to be any more reason for H to reason to the contradictory of what
 was said than to any of a number of other propositions. Thus, as Grice says, '[H] might
 just be baffled, or might suppose that, despite the apparent falsity of the remark, [S]
 was meaning something like He is, usually, a fine friend: how could he have treated
 me like that?' (Grice 1989:53).
 If the ambiguity of plastic flower were a consequence of the mechanisms for produc-
 ing particularized implicatures, either along Gricean lines or along the lines of Sperber
 and Wilson's 1986 simplification of Gricean pragmatics, then utterances of plastic
 flower would have to receive the sense 'imitation flower made of plastic' on the basis
 of their grammatical meaning 'flower made of plastic' together with features of the
 context. It is farfetched to suppose that speakers use an expression with the meaning
 'flower made of plastic' to get across the meaning 'imitation flower made of plastic'
 via a violation of an imperative to speak the truth or be relevant. This would be an
 extreme of indirection.
 A second problem is that cases with conjunctive and nonconjunctive interpretations
 BOTH of which are nonempty-such as plastic heart and stuffed animal-would be
 unaccounted for. In these cases, there is no natural inconsistency, and so no basis for
 the application of the suggested pragmatic rules. Hearers do not infer that speakers
 mean 'imitation heart made of plastic' or 'stuffed toy animal' because there can be no
 plastic hearts or stuffed animals in the conjunctive sense. Clearly, there are such things.
 Conversely, the pragmatic approach cannot account for cases where natural inconsis-
 tency does not seem to implicate nonconjunctive interpretation-cases such as immortal
 animal, human horse, invisible woman, positive electron and rubber air. There simply
 are no such things-imitation or otherwise. How shall these differences be explained?
 Finally, even granting that hearers routinely are able to infer nonconjunctive interpre-
 tations for those compounds whose conjunctive senses are not in general use, the ques-
 tion of whether or not the interpretation they infer is one that is already available in
 the language is left open. Compare the expressions in 1 to the expressions cleave and
 dust. We do not claim that these words have only one meaning in the language, say,
 'split apart' and 'remove dust from', respectively, and that their other meanings-'re-
 main joined' and 'put dust on' -are derived pragmatically on the basis of clues from
 the contexts of their utterance. We do not claim this, even though the interpretations
 are quite closely related. At best, we allow that on a given occasion of utterance a
 speaker may (perhaps because of lexical ignorance) have to reason from contextual
 information to a reading of the word-type cleave or dust that is already available in
 17 It is important that such implicatures be established by reasoning (Grice 1989:31) based on knowledge
 of features of the expression and the context of utterance-and not just assigned to utterance types generally.
 Such assignment would not differ in anything but name from the semantic account we favor.
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 the language. So the possibility of determining an interpretation of a speaker's utterance
 on the basis of a linguistic meaning and features of context does not in itself indicate
 that the inferred interpretation is only a pragmatic one. The claim that an ambiguity is
 pragmatic, and not semantic, must be justified on other grounds.
 Consider, then, the following cases. Astronauts newly arrived on an Earth-like planet
 wonder whether the store called Silk Flowers! sells flowers made of silk or silk imitation
 flowers. The heart specialist leaves her assistant a note saying Bring a plastic heart
 with you; the assistant wonders whether she wants a real (working) heart made of
 plastic, or a plastic model. The taxidermist's son doesn't know whether to be elated
 or disgusted when his mother tells him she's going to bring him a stuffed animal on
 his birthday. The rabbi wonders whether or not he should bemoan lax alien standards
 when he sees kosher bacon on the menu of the Twin-Jerusalem Restaurant. In each
 case, we claim, context permits a choice of interpretation, but it is a choice from among
 a limited number of determinate options. Particularized implicatures don't work this
 way. If one is puzzled by an utterance because its intended meaning is obviously not
 its literal one, further information does not enable a choice among antecedently available
 interpretations, but rather an inference to a novel one. Though one might glean from
 context that an utterance of stuffed animal is intended to refer to a sexually repressed
 colleague, for example, the boy has no reason to wonder whether his mother intends
 to bring her boss to his birthday party.
 Plastic flower et al. also pass Recanati's plausible test for distinguishing semantic
 from pragmatic ambiguity, viz., that 'In uttering a semantically ambiguous sentence,
 the speaker rarely intends to communicate more than one of the possible readings ...
 but he may very well do so if the ambiguity is pragmatic' (Recanati 1987:63, n. 8).
 Note that, in fact, it is semantically impossible to assert more than one of the possible
 readings of plastic flower et al., since they are necessarily inconsistent-imitation
 plastic flowers CAN'T BE real plastic flowers. Double entendres are special cases, usually
 intended to cause amusement (vide the last sentence of the previous paragraph).18
 There does not seem, then, to be a rationale for the claim that the nonconjunctive
 interpretations of the expressions in 1 arise in context on the basis of pragmatic reason-
 ing. Without explicit principles that might produce these interpretations, the pragmatic
 approach is left implausibly claiming that, for no particular reason, we assign utterances
 such as plastic flower interpretations only partially related, and in unknown ways, to
 the meanings of their expression types in the language. In contrast, a semantic account,
 such as the one we will propose in the next section, provides an explanation for the
 availability of the nonconjunctive interpretations of utterances of these expressions as
 a feature of the expression type of which they are tokens. The task of a pragmatic
 theory is thus just to explain how tokens of the type plastic flower are disambiguated
 by contextual factors that control the assignment of one or the other interpretation on
 one or another particular occasion of utterance.
 5. COMPOSITIONAL IDIOMS. In contrast with the conjunctive senses of the expressions
 in 1, the nonconjunctive senses are not straightforwardly compositional. The only way
 in which both senses of plastic flower et al. could be straightforwardly compositional
 is if either the modifier or the head also had the sense imitation. But it would not be
 plausible to postulate ambiguity in this way. Recall the point made in the discussion
 18 See also ?7, below, exx. 21-26, for further illustration of what we take to be the purely semantic facts
 in these cases.
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 of exx. 2-6 that such expressions as that flower is plastic and that animal is stuffed are
 not ambiguous. Moreover, we would also have to say that indefinitely many modifiers
 (tin, clay, paper, cloth, rubber, and so on) or noun phrases (soldier, animal, Indian,
 chicken, bacon) were ambiguous, thereby multiplying ambiguity beyond necessity and
 giving us the wrong meanings for indefinitely many expressions (plastic is cheap, tin
 is a metal, animals are not toys, bacon is pork, stuffed artichokes are edible, etc.).
 Inasmuch as the nonconjunctive senses of the expressions in 1 are not derived from
 the senses of their lexical constituents, they resemble the senses of standard (fully
 noncompositional) idioms such as kick the bucket, chew the fat and shoot the breeze.
 But they also differ from the senses of standard idioms in that the lexical constituents
 of a compositional idiom contribute their senses to the sense of the syntactically complex
 expression. Thus, kosher bacon means 'imitation bacon made according to kosher law',
 which includes the senses of both the lexical constituents bacon and kosher.
 The point is strikingly illustrated in the contrast of the nonconjunctive sense of plastic
 flower with both senses of kick the bucket. On the one hand, the senses of plastic and
 flower do not comprise the sense of plastic flower in the strictly compositional way
 that the senses of kick, the, and bucket comprise the 'put-a-foot-to-it' sense of kick the
 bucket, and, on the other, the senses of plastic and flJower are not absent from the sense
 of plastic flower in the way that the senses of kick, the, and bucket are absent from the
 die sense of kick the bucket. The expressions in 1 thus represent a hitherto unrecognized
 class of expressions, intermediate between standard idioms and purely compositional
 expressions. Hence, the term COMPOSITIONAL IDIOM.
 Compositional idioms also differ from standard idioms in being productive, as men-
 tioned above. We have not only plastic flower, stuffed animal, kosher bacon and vege-
 tarian chicken, but also wooden flower, plastic banana, stuffed giraffe, stuffed albino
 Bengal tiger, kosher ham, kosher black forest ham, vegetarian pork, vegetarian barbe-
 cued pork, and so on, all, as noted above, with related and predictable meanings. Plastic
 flower has the sense imitation flower made of plastic; stuffed animal has the sense
 imitation (or toy) animal made by a process of stuffing, kosher bacon has the sense
 imitation bacon made in accordance with kosher law, and so on. If we factor out the
 component meanings of such senses that have come from the lexical constituents in
 expressions like plastic flower, we are left with the schematic sense 9 in which X and
 Y are, as it were, slots for the meanings of the lexical constituents.
 (9) imitation X made of Y
 We will call such schematic senses IDIOM SCHEMATA. Such elements (with appropriate
 adjustments) are common to all compositional idioms.
 The presence of an unsaturated idiomatic element is not unique to the class of expres-
 sions under consideration here. Fraser 1970, for example, discusses a class of idioms,
 which he calls DISCONTINUOUS, that contain an argument place, e.g. bring [something]
 to light, lead [someone] a merry chase, pull [someone's] leg, pull the wool over [some-
 one's] eyes, and lose [one's] mind. He suggests that these expressions be entered in
 the lexicon with variables (bring-[x]-to-light, lead-[x]-a-merry-chase, etc.).'9
 19 We would add to Fraser's list the idiom schema take a(n) [x] to, as in, for example, take a broom to,
 take a mop to, take a vacuum to, take a rag to, take a sponge to, and so on. We would also add take a whip
 to, take a switch to, take a paddle to, take a belt to, 'and so on. In these cases, the incomplete verb is assigned
 a meaning idiomatically-in the former cases, clean with [the implement denoted] and, in the latter, hit with
 [the implement denoted]-and the meaning is completed compositionally, once the variable is replaced with
 the meaning of the noun. Note as well that, as with the examples in 1, these expressions are ambiguous
 between idiomatic and nonidiomatic senses.
 Contrary to the position we take here, Fraser suggests that the first two expressions mentioned above may
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 What is unique to the class of expressions under consideration here is that the unsatu-
 rated element in their meaning is not syntactically realized, but emerges only on a
 semantic analysis of the full NP. A strong argument for this account is that it explains
 the otherwise mysterious fact that the immediate context of Superman in sentences
 such as Lois Lane has a plastic Superman on her desk is intensional. If we substitute
 Clark Kent for the coreferential term Superman in this sentence, we may go from a
 truth to a falsehood (it doesn't follow from Lois Lane's having a plastic Superman on
 her desk that she has a plastic Clark Kent on her desk, even though Superman and
 Clark Kent are the same person). It is clear that the modifiers plastic, wooden, and so
 on are not themselves intensional, and, hence, are not the source of the intensionality of
 their contexts. Further, neither has nor any other syntactic constituent in such sentences
 explains the intensionality.
 On our account, however, there is no mystery about why the context is intensional.
 The source of the intensionality of the context is the sense of the predicate imitation
 in 9. This sense is a decompositional component of the senses of the compositional
 idioms under consideration here, and applies to senses that replace the variable X in
 the compositional process.20 If we replace Superman with Clark Kent, yielding Lois
 Lane has a plastic Clark Kent on her desk, the sense of Clark Kent replaces the variable
 X in 9, and the object of has is different. In the one case, it is an imitation Superman
 made of plastic and, in the other, an imitation Clark Kent made of plastic. Hence,
 substituting Clark Kent for Superman can change the truth value of the sentence. Mutatis
 mutandis for other coreferential expressions, such as cordate and renate or unicorn
 and minotaur.21
 The compositional aspect of the sense of a compositional idiom results from the
 insertion of the senses of the nominal constituents into the appropriate slots in its
 idiom schema. The insertion works by the same compositional operations that provide
 meanings for purely compositional expressions. In the latter, interpretations are assigned
 to individual words and combined according to fixed rules associated with specific
 syntactic configurations to yield a derived interpretation. Thus, for example, in a gram-
 mar that assigns the verb phrase kick the can the structure represented in Figure 3 the
 meaning of the phrase is compositionally derived from the meaning of the verb and
 the meaning of the noun phrase. The sense of the verb kick is schematic, too, having
 a slot for senses of its subject and another for senses of its direct object. These slots
 are marked for the source of the senses that can occupy them. The compositional
 operation in this case is inserting the sense of the NP in the slot marked for NPs
 be entered as bring to light and lead a merry chase, with an associated movement rule in the syntax that
 converts them into the forms above-in analogy to the way look up [NP] may be converted into look [NP]
 up. However, this suggestion will not work for cases like pull [someone's] leg and pull the wool over
 [someone's] eyes, since they do not survive extraction of their variables, cf. *pull leg and *pull the wool
 over eyes. We prefer the option affording the greatest generality.
 20 The sense of an expression o- is decompositional if and only if it has a proper part that is not the sense
 of any syntactic constituent of a.
 21 Though it is not part of the present project to provide a complete explanation of the intensionality of
 these expressions, we think it is likely that the intensionality of imitation can be explained by reference to
 the fact that imitation Fs are things that are made with the intention that they serve some purpose or function
 served by Fs, in virtue of sharing some of the properties of Fs, though not any subset of those properties
 sufficient unto being an F (such things being artificial Fs, which can be Fs).
 It is also worth pointing out that our account provides an explanation of the fact, mentioned above, that
 plastic et al. have independent extensions, whereas standard intensional modifiers, such as imitation, alleged,
 former, future et al., do not (again, plastic et al. are not intensional modifiers).
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 VP
 V NP
 kick D N
 the can
 FIGURE 3. Compositional expression.
 functioning as direct objects of the verb and assigning the derived sense to the VP
 node. (The meaning of the embedded NP is similarly derived from the meaning of the
 noun and the meaning of the determiner, and assigned to the NP node.) Given that the
 X and Y slots in 9 are suitably marked, the same compositional operation would be
 applicable in this case, too.
 In the semantics of purely idiomatic expressions, a sense is assigned to the expression
 as a whole, and not determined as a function of its lexical parts and their syntactic
 relations. Let us suppose that the syntactic analysis of the phrase kick the bucket is as
 shown in Figure 4.
 VP
 V NP
 kick D N
 the bucket
 FIGURE 4. Idiomatic expression.
 Here the compositional interpretation is derived in the same way as that of kick the
 can, but the idiomatic sense, die, must be assigned directly from the dictionary to the
 VP node, as if the entire verb phrase were a lexical item.
 These examples illustrate the standard cases of compositionality and idiomaticity.
 The new case of compositional idioms shares features of both standard cases. Let us
 suppose that the syntactic analysis of plastic flower is as represented in Figure 5.22
 Like standard compositional expressions and unlike standard idioms, the terminal sym-
 bols in the structure represented in Fig. 5 must be individually interpreted. This has to
 22 The analysis assumed here is consistent with principles of recent GB syntax. According to X-bar theory,
 any maximal projection (NP, VP, AP, IP ( = S), etc.) has three positions, Specifier, Head and Complement
 (see Chomsky 1986:2-4). Thus, we are here taking plastic flower to be an NP with head flower and N
 modifierplastic in the Specifier position. (The N' level is not represented, since there is nothing in Complement
 position) We won't argue for this analysis here, however, since the points we want to make could easily be
 adapted to other syntactic analyses.
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 NP
 NP N
 plastic flower
 FIGURE 5. Compositional idiom.
 be the case because of the generalization that the meanings of the terminal elements
 in the expressions in 1 are part of the meaning of the entire phrase.
 But like the case of standard idioms and unlike the case of standard compositional
 expressions, the meanings of the terminal elements do not combine with each other.
 That is, the nonconjunctive sense of plastic flower contrasts in this respect with the
 conjunctive sense flower made of plastic. Moreover, and this is critical, there are no
 other terminal elements in the structure with which the meanings of plastic andflower
 can combine. This is precisely what makes it appear initially that compositional idioms
 are an impossibility. But, as with many other paradoxes, the resolution lies in locating
 a false assumption in the reasoning leading to the impossibility. In the present case, the
 false assumption is that compositional steps invoke only readings assigned to terminal
 elements, or readings derived from readings assigned to terminal elements.
 We already know this assumption is false. In the case of the idiomatic sense of a
 sentence like 10,
 (10) Methuselah kicked the bucket.
 the sense of the terminal element Methuselah has to combine with the (idiomatic) sense
 of the VP, but the sense of the VP is not the sense of a terminal element or a sense
 derived from senses of terminal elements. The mistake is the supposition that the senses
 of the lexical items in a sentence are just senses of terminal elements in its syntactic
 structure. The nonterminal VP element in the syntactic structure of 10 has to obtain
 the sense die directly from a dictionary entry for the idiom kick the bucket. This entry
 has to mark the sense as the sense of expressions in the category VP and the sense has
 to be assigned directly from the dictionary entry to the nonterminal VP node in the
 part of the syntactic structure of 10 represented in Fig. 4. The idiomatic sense of 10
 results when the sense of Methuselah is inserted into the place marked for a sense of
 the subject of the sentence in the compositional process.23
 Our account of the compositional idioms in 1 simply extends this idea of having
 dictionary entries for senses that can be assigned to nonterminal nodes in the syntactic
 structure of expressions. The extension involves little more than a generalization from
 the category VP to the category NP. We introduce an entry for the sense 9 into the
 dictionary, which permits the dictionary stage of the compositional process to assign
 that sense to the topmost NP in structures like the one represented in Fig. 5, as well
 as assigning the sense in the dictionary entry for the noun plastic to the NP-dominated
 node NP and assigning the sense in the dictionary entry for the noun flower to the node
 N. Since the sense of 9 has a place marked for the sense of the term under NP-dominated
 23 See Katz 1973:357-76, for a discussion of a possible mechanism for assigning the senses of idioms to
 nonterminal nodes.
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 NP and one marked for the sense of the term under node N, the senses of plastic and
 flower can be combined with the sense of 9 by a familiar compositional operation.
 The productivity of the compound nouns in 1 can now be explained in terms of the
 substitution of appropriate senses into the same idiom schema 9. Since the idiom schema
 is (roughly) the same for all of them, and combines with the nominal meanings in the
 same way for every compound, the resultant meanings are predictable as a composi-
 tional function of the meanings of their constituents. Our account thus provides a basis
 for explaining the semantic facts about the expressions in 1.
 Of course, not any sense of an expression occurring as NP-dominated NP in the
 structure represented in Fig. 5 can combine with the sense of 9. For example, senses
 expressing color concepts cannot. The idiomatic senses of blue moon and blue movie
 or red spy and red herring are not compositionally idiomatic in the way that plastic
 flower is. Similarly, senses expressing smell, shape, size, weight, commercial value,
 and so forth cannot combine with the sense of 9 to yield a compositional idiom. There
 is a restriction governing the Y slot in 9 that limits insertions to senses containing the
 sense 'material substance'. Similarly, not any sense of an expression occurring as N
 can appear in the X slot in 9. There is a restriction to senses containing the sense physical
 object that blocks senses for expressions like plastic heartburn, plastic ectoplasm, and
 plastic fraction. (The restrictions governing the X and Y slots will undoubtedly require
 some fine tuning, especially for the cases we have not explicitly represented.)
 No further substantive clauses are required. The nonconjunctive sense is a general
 feature of expressions with the structure represented in Fig. 5 where the sense of the
 modifier has the component material substance and the sense of the head has the
 component physical object. In some cases, the nonconjunctive sense may not be imme-
 diately apparent, but it becomes so when we think of it in an appropriate sentential
 context. The expressions plastic comb, gold coin, and wooden tree initially seem not
 to have a nonconjunctive sense. But plastic comb means 'imitation comb made of
 plastic' in The sign over the door of Hilda's hair salon is afive-foot-long plastic comb,
 gold coin means 'imitation coin made of gold' in The director wanted to have a jewelry
 shop in the neighborhood make gold coins for this production of the Merchant of
 Venice, and wooden tree means 'imitation tree made of wood' in Can you go to the
 store and get wooden trees for the model railroad to replace those crummy plastic
 ones?
 On this account of compositional idioms, the explanation of the fact that the senses
 of the expressions in 1 have a component sense in common is that an idiom schema
 like the one in 9 is part of the meaning of those expressions, and the explanation of
 the fact that the senses of the expressions differ as their lexical items differ is that the
 meaning of such expressions comes from the insertion of the senses of their items into
 the appropriate slots in the idiom schema.
 The apparatus of semantic markers and categorized variables in Katz 1972 provides
 a means of formalizing this account of compositional idioms. We assume that lexical
 entries generally consist of a lexical item with an associated set of syntactic, phonologi-
 cal and semantic representations. Entries for idiom schemata will differ only in that
 their syntactic categorization allows their semantic representation to be assigned directly
 to phrasal constituents. Thus, the semantic representation for the idiom schema 9 is
 Figure 6. The categorized variables in Fig. 6 are the expanded versions of the X and
 Y in 9. They are categorized both syntactically and semantically. The syntactic categori-
 zation appearing in brackets above the X specifies the constituent(s) in a partially
 interpreted phrase marker from which their values can come. The syntactic categoriza-
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 (Object)
 (Physical)
 [N, NP] [NP, NP]
 ((Imitation) Y ) ((Made of) X )
 K (Object) ) (Substance)
 (Physical) (Material)
 FIGURE 6. Idiom schema.
 tions of the variables thus restrict the availability of this interpretation to complex NPs
 with just the syntactic structure we have assigned to the expressions in 1. Further, they
 restrict the interpretation of NPs with this structure by assigning the reading associated
 with the item on the left branch to the right variable, and the reading associated with
 the item on the right branch to the left variable (thereby preventing the expression glass
 eye, for example, from being assigned the reading *'imitation glass made of eye').
 The selection restriction in angle brackets below the X specifies the semantic mark-
 er(s) that a semantic representation must have to qualify as a value of such a variable.
 In this way, selection restrictions insure that no semantic representation is assigned
 where there is no sense to represent. The clauses of these selection restrictions prevent
 expressions like chocolate intention, rubber number, and wooden vacation from being
 represented as having a sense, and, hence, as meaningful. However, the representations
 of NP-dominated NP and N in the expressions in 1 have the semantic markers that
 qualify them as values of the variables in the representation in Fig. 6, and, hence, these
 expressions are assigned derived representations. They are thus represented as having
 a sense, and, hence, as meaningful.
 6. COMPOSITIONAL EXPRESSIONS, IDIOMS, AND COMPOSITIONAL IDIOMS. Since the senses
 of the expressions in 1 are not FULLY a function of the senses of their syntactic constitu-
 ents, they are partly idiomatic. Since the senses of the whole expressions in 1 are
 PARTIALLY a function of the senses of their syntactic constituents and their syntactic
 relations in the expression, they are partly compositional. The complete meaning of
 the syntactically compound nouns represented by the expressions in 1 is thus both partly
 idiomatic and partly compositional. To characterize the notions of compositionality and
 idiomaticity in a way that allows for compositional idioms, we offer the definitions
 11-13.
 (11) A syntactically complex expression E is fully compositional just in case the
 meaning of E and of each syntactically complex subconstituent of E is a
 function of the meanings of the terminal elements in E and their syntactic
 relations.
 (12) A syntactically complex expression E is a standard idiom just in case the
 meaning of E is not a function of the meanings of the terminal and nonterminal
 elements in E and their syntactic relations.
 (13) A syntactically complex expression E is a compositional idiom just in case
 the meaning of E is not fully compositional, but is a function of the meanings
 of F's terminal and nonterminal elements and their syntactic relations.24
 24 The term NONTERMINAL ELEMENTS should be understood as not including nondominated nonterminal
 elements, since, of necessity, the sense of every expression is a function of the sense of the whole expression
 itself (viz., the identity function).
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 7. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTENSIONALIST APPROACHES. Extensional approaches do not
 recognize the grammatical structure necessary to account for the productive way the
 expressions in 1 blend compositionality and idiomaticity. The reason is simply that
 extensional functions are not senses. Extensional functions are mappings from a domain
 to an extension. Senses are not relations between language and the world, but, like
 phrase structure, are part of the structure of the sentences of a language. Senses are
 purely grammatical objects. Hence, the mathematical functions that appear in a theory
 of sense structure must be sharply distinguished from extensional functions. Such inten-
 sional functions are, on the one hand, noncompositional functions that assign senses
 to lexical items and, on the other, compositional functions that assign senses to syntacti-
 cally complex expressions. The role of such functions in the semantic interpretation of
 sentences is to relate senses and sentences within the language.
 The basic claim of extensionalist approaches to meaning-that meanings are map-
 pings from the expressions of a language into its domain-assumes that the only gram-
 matical structure required for writing rules which account for all the semantic properties
 of a language is the phonological and syntactic structure of the expressions. Since the
 rules of such a grammar do not refer to semantic levels of grammatical structure, there
 is no grammatical level at which the structure of senses is represented. In GB theory,
 the assumption is that grammatically specifiable semantics can be handled entirely at
 the grammatical level of LOGICAL FORM.
 In contrast, the basic claim of intensionalist approaches to meaning is that rules for
 writing grammars refer to a level beyond syntax at which the structure of senses is
 represented. Parallel to the claim of transformationalists that there is a level of deep
 structure not reflected in surface structure, intensionalists claim that there is a level of
 sense structure not reflected in syntactic structure. The claim has been based on cases
 where grammatical rules have to refer to sense structure not reflected in syntactic
 structure in order to capture significant grammatical relations.
 The literature contains many examples supporting this claim. One set is 14-20.
 (14) good knife
 (15) knife that cuts well
 (16) good watch
 (17) watch that keeps time well
 (18) Good knives cut well.
 (19) The knife is good even if its blade doesn't cut well.
 (20) The knife is good even if its handle isn't.
 Katz (1966:288-317) uses these examples to show that we cannot account for properties
 and relations like synonymy, analyticity, and contradiction without a level at which
 sense structure is displayed. The synonymy of 14 and 15 and of 16 and 17 cannot be
 accounted for without representing the syntactic simples knife and watch as having
 semantically complex senses in which, respectively, the senses having the function of
 cutting and having the function of keeping time are represented and distinguished from
 other sense components such as physical object or having a handle. Similarly, for the
 analyticity of 18, the contradictoriness of 19 and the noncontradictoriness of 20.
 The cases discussed in this article provide further support for the thesis that the
 grammar of a natural language has a decompositional semantic level at which the
 complex sense structure of syntactic simples can be formally displayed. Without such
 a level, the absence of a correspondence between syntactic structure and semantic
 structure prevents extensional approaches from being able to explain the sense proper-
 ties and relations of such cases. We cannot explain the fact that plastic flower and the
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 other expressions in 1 are ambiguous. The explanation, as shown above, requires a
 decompositional analysis. Not only do we have to refer to the components of the sense
 of NP-dominated NP and N in NPs like plastic flower, just as the explanation of 14-20
 requires us to refer to the components of the senses of the words knife, watch and
 good,25 but we have to refer to an underived component of the sense of the entire NP.
 This reference is all the more obvious when compositional idioms appear as constituents
 in expressions, such as 21-26.
 (21) Kosher bacon is not real bacon.
 (22) Valuable antique wooden Indians regret current laws.
 (23) This plastic flower is a better imitation of the real thing than that.
 (24) The real thing, of which this plastic flower is an imitation, is a flower.
 (25) counterfeit gold coin
 (26) picture of a stuffed alligator
 Such reference is required to explain the analyticity (on a sense) of 21, the semantic
 deviance (on a sense) of 22, the analytic entailment of 24 by 23, and the ambiguity of
 26 but not of 25.
 In addition to significantly extending earlier evidence for thinking that extensional
 approaches do not account for all grammatical properties and relations, this evidence
 also shows that such approaches cannot even account for all extensional properties and
 relations. To be sure, extensional functions can account for the extensional structure
 of the conjunctive readings of the expressions in 1, but they cannot account for the
 extensional structure of the nonconjunctive readings. If the nonconjunctive readings
 were purely idiomatic, the expressions in 1 could receive an appropriate extension by
 simply assigning them an extensional function. But, since the expressions in 1 are partly
 compositional, a proper treatment of them requires rules that relate their idiomatic and
 compositional aspects. Without a level at which complex sense structure is formally
 displayed, such rules have to assign an extensional function fi to NP-dominated NP
 and an extensional function fj to N, and then get the extension of the entire NP from
 fi and fj. Since expressions like toy gun and imitation butter do not involve an idiom
 schema, they might be handled by assigning toy N or imitation N a function whose
 output is the set of toy or imitation Ns. But the expressions in 1 are different in not
 containing a lexical item that can be treated in this way, thereby making such an
 extensionalist approach unavailable.26
 Having no lexical item that might be interpreted on the basis of an extensional
 function whose output is the set of imitation, the only strategy for using extensional
 functions to interpret the expressions in 1 is to assign a function (perhaps to the NP
 node) which transforms the function assigned to NP-dominated NP into a function
 25 Compare, for example, the analyticity (on a sense) of wooden legs are imitation limbs, the contradictori-
 ness (on a sense) of stuffed parrots are not imitation birds, and the antonymy of kosher bacon and kosher
 ham.
 26 Though we would claim that such an extensional approach doesn't work even in cases like toy gun
 because a full description of them would require reference to decompositional structure. An account of the
 sense of toy has to represent it as meaning something like imitation X to serve in play involving pretending
 to Y, where X is the component of the sense of the NP-dominated NP and Y is the component of the sense
 of the NP-dominated N which expresses the function the artifact is intended to serve. On this account, toy
 gun will be represented as meaning 'imitation gun to serve in play involving pretending to shoot'. Similarly,
 toy watch will be represented as meaning 'imitation watch to serve in play involving pretending to tell time'.
 Decompositional analysis of gun and watch is required to obtain the functions of shooting and telling time
 for toy gun and toy watch, respectively.
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 whose output is the set of imitation Ns. But surely this is ad hoc in the context of a
 theory that does not recognize syntactically unrealized semantically significant struc-
 ture. Moreover, such a strategy will fail to explain facts such as that kosher bacon is
 kosher meat, rubber ducks are rubber birds, and stuffed elephants are stuffed animals.
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